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Non-technical summary
We investigate the evolution and the distribution of the unification bonus or
malus for a representative sample of citizens of the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR). The unification bonus is defined as the present discounted
value as of July 1, 1990 of the difference between an Eastern German
individual’s actual real income stream (adjusted for household composition) and
the counterfactual real income stream that could have reasonably been expected
under a continuation of economic life in a static GDR through 1998. The
assumption of a static GDR is both strong and optimistic, so our estimates of the
proportion of economic losers from unification in the East can be regarded as an
upper bound.
Two central issues are tackled in this study. First, the construction of valid
deflators for a comparison of real incomes in transition from a centralized to a
market economy and second, the estimation of the hypothetical income streams
former GDR citizens would have experienced under a continuation of the GDR.
The deflators are calculated from a hitherto unexploited data set of the Federal
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). This data set also allows us to
calculate deflators for different points in the distribution of equivalized incomes.
The hypothetical income streams are based on projections using the German
Socio-Economic Panel that was expanded to include households from the
German Democratic Republic in June 1990, hardly half a year after the Berlin
wall had fallen and just before the wholesale introduction of the Deutsche Mark
to the East.
Our central result is that 19 percent of the East Germans are estimated to have
experienced a present value malus from unification. Gains were sufficiently
large that on average individuals in our sample experienced a present discounted
value of their annual bonuses (maluses) over the period 1991-98 equal to twice
the size of their 1990 real incomes. Moreover, the aggregate bonus for the
sample is larger than its aggregate malus by a factor of ten. We also find that the
percentage of East Germans with an annual unification malus has declined over
time from 38 percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 1998, however the rate of decline
appears to be larger in the first part of the 1990s than in the second. This trend
break fits well with the observed evolution of macroeconomic indicators for
Eastern Germany over the same time period.
Unlike any other transition economy, the elderly in the new federal states have
experienced a dramatic improvement in their standards of living. Fewer than 2
percent of East Germans above age 65 in 1990 had a negative bonus (i.e. a
malus), whereas women between 45 and 54 show the highest proportion with a
malus and women between 35 and 44 received the lowest net average bonus.
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Abstract
This paper presents estimates of the unification bonus for East Germans over the
period 1991 to 1998.  The unification bonus is defined as the discounted value
of the difference between a person’s actual income and his or her counterfactual
real income stream forecast for a hypothetical continuation of economic life in a
static GDR. The two main issues tackled in this study are the construction of
valid deflators for a comparison of real incomes during the transition from a
centralized to a market economy and the estimation of plausible counterfactual
income streams. Our central result is that 19 percent of East Germans received a
present value malus and so can be regarded as unification losers but that the
aggregate bonus is ten times the size of the aggregate malus of the sample.
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21 The problem
On the eve of German unification then Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl made
the unambiguous claim that following German unification no one would be
worse off and many would be much better off.1 A prediction that a genuine
social and economic revolution will lead to a Pareto improvement in the strict
sense of no losers whatsoever is hardly one based in human experience. Our
purpose in this paper is to attempt to gauge the extent of the discrepancy
between Kohl’s verbalization of the hopes of many Germans during the
euphoria of just over one decade ago and the impressive, though definitely
mixed, historical record that has unfolded in the meantime.2
The six panels of Figure 1 capture much of the relevant aggregate story of East
Germany’s economic transition to the market economy. Simultaneous with
significant real income gains, the East German labor market has been
characterized by high and persistent unemployment rates. Official registered
unemployment does not include roughly half as many people again who
participate in active labor market programs (essentially income maintenance
schemes) or have accepted the terms of special early retirement pensions. The
German Council of Economic Experts counts these individuals – still nearly one
million –  as hidden unemployed. Hidden and registered unemployment together
has hovered at a level well above a quarter of the East German labor force for
close to a decade already. The initial strong recovery that followed the
immediate collapse of industrial production in the first year of economic
unification3 was followed by a marked deceleration of real economic growth.
Indeed, real GDP growth rates in East Germany have even fallen below those in
West Germany. The single most important difference between the East German
case and all other economies in economic transition has of course been the good
fortune of a steady inflow of net transfers from West to East that continue and
still amount to approximately one third of the value of East German GDP each
year. East Germans experienced a significant burst of inflation in the first years
of unification and we note that nominal pay levels were indeed rapidly catching
up with West German levels. But as the final panel shows, productivity has not
increased nearly fast enough over the past decade to bring down East German
unit labor costs in line with those in West Germany.
                                          
1 Less well remembered is that Helmut Kohl was most explicit in including both eastern and
western Germany in his “promise”. The promise was made in Kohl’s speech on June 21,
1990 before the Bundestag. It has been reprinted in Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik (1990:
396).
2 Comprehensive surveys of this dramatic economic history are found in Sinn and Sinn
(1992) and Siebert (1993).
3 Akerlof, et al. (1991).
3Figure 1: Key Economic Indicators of Postwall Eastern Germany
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, German Council of Economic Experts’ Annual Reports,
Deutscher Bundestag (1998), Collier (2001), Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung et al.
(1999), Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute
(2000).
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4One striking pattern is immediately apparent in the panels of Figure 1: the mid-
1990s reveal a break in the trend or even trend reversal. This pattern is also seen
in our analysis that follows.
With the aggregate background brushed in with a few broad empirical strokes,
we are ready to begin the detailed microeconometric examination of the course
of nominal incomes and prices. The object of our empirical attention is what we
have chosen to call the unification bonus defined as the present discounted value
as of July 1, 1990 of the difference between an Eastern German individual’s
observed real income stream (adjusted for household composition) and the
counterfactual real income stream that would have been experienced under a
continuation of economic life in a static GDR through 1998. For lack of a better
term we call a negative bonus a unification malus. While there can be no doubt
that such a measure of economic welfare should be systematically related to
what is generally understood as the winners and losers from German unification,
economic welfare is only one of several dimensions of social welfare. We hope
that careful readers will share our reluctance to leap from the distribution of the
unification bonus or malus to the grand question of “winners” versus “losers”
just quite yet.4 Still we believe the principal contribution of this paper is that it
offers the best estimates to date of the real income gains and losses in Eastern
Germany following the reunification of Germany in 1990.
Previous economic studies that have examined the impact of reunification at the
individual level have for the most part exclusively focussed on nominal income
mobility in East Germany. Among those Krause and Habich (1993) look at the
changes of household income that took place during the early years of transition,
Hauser and Fabig (1999) investigate labor and household income mobility
between 1990 and 1995 and Steiner and Kraus (1996) analyze the distribution of
labor income from 1989 to 1993. All studies use the German Socio-Economic
Panel. The main results from these studies have been that income mobility in the
East was higher at first and has approached the Western level over time. The
probability of falling within the distribution is higher for individuals and
households who have experienced unemployment. Women are more at risk to
end up in a lower income quantile than men. However due to the lack of
anything but extremely crude purchasing power parity indexes that link post-
GDR prices in Eastern Germany to prices in the GDR, there are really no
satisfactory comparisons of 1990 real incomes with those in 1998.
In his 1992 study Hauser conjectured that inequality would increase in Eastern
Germany during the transition process. Indeed this hypothesis was confirmed in
                                          
4 Readers will also note that we often fail to take our own advice and in the interest of
expository convenience will refer to winners and losers anyway. When we refer to winners
we only mean a unification bonus greater than zero.
5a later study by Hauser and Wagner (1996). Similarly Grabka and Otto (2001)
calculate that East German market incomes have become more unequally
distributed over time. We are concerned in this paper with the distribution of the
unification bonus which we believe is a better indicator for welfare gains from
transition.
The lack of appropriate purchasing power parities to convert the 1990 Eastern
Mark into DM is widely recognized throughout the literature. For example
Hauser (1992: 62) does point to the presence of quantity constraints and the
extensive use of subsidies in the former GDR that make a satisfactory
comparison of the purchasing power of money in divided Germany difficult to
achieve. Here is where the main contribution of the present paper is to be found:
the combination of forecasts of GDR living standards, tailored to individual and
household circumstances, with purchasing-power-parity indexes that link post-
GDR prices in Eastern Germany to prices in the GDR on the eve of German
economic unification.
The household income data we analyze are taken from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) that began to include Eastern German households
(1,944 individuals are in our sample) even before German Economic, Monetary
and Social Union actually went into effect on July 1, 1990. Exact price deflators
have been constructed from data collected by the German Federal Statistical
Office. The assumption of a static GDR economy as the benchmark for our
counterfactual has been chosen more for the psychological salience of the final
year of the GDR economy than as a realistic forecast of an economy whose time
was indeed running out5. This is probably the best reason to consider our
estimate of the aggregate unification bonus as merely a lower bound for the true
bonus. The assumption of static expectations has the additional merit of
providing a way to use the cross-section of economic life reported in the first
Eastern wave of GSOEP to generate counterfactual real income streams to the
present, conditional on individual characteristics. The assumption of static
expectations excludes economic growth or equivalently any cohort effects. We
have assumed that as an individual’s age, household composition and job-related
characteristics changed over the past decade, the relevant comparison for
judging his or her relative gain or loss would be that of someone else with the
same age and other individual characteristics in the 1990 sample. We calculate
the unification bonus from the perspective of the individual and not the
household.
                                          
5 This is the more or less the bottom line of the classified report prepared for the GDR’s
Politbüro dated October 30, 1989 prepared by the Chairman of the State Planning
Commission,  see Schürer (1992).
6According to our estimates for about 19 percent of the GSOEP sample ages 25
years and above at the time of German unification, real income losses following
German economic unification have actually exceeded the gains. On the other
hand, we also calculate that aggregate gains of the unification „winners“ have
swamped the aggregate losses of the „losers“. Expressed as a present discounted
value (valued in 1991 DM) the average bonus of the 81% unification „winners“
was over 39,000 DM vs. the average unification loss of 15,700 DM of the other
19% of our sample. The vast bulk of the unification malus has been concentrated
in the cohorts that were between 35 and 54 years of age in 1990 with the largest
unification bonuses going to those 55 years and older in 1990.
One disturbing tendency observed in our data is that figures for 1997 and 1998
point to a falling share of those with a positive annual unification gain, a
development that is hardly surprising in light of the dramatic deceleration that
occurred in Eastern German GDP growth during the second half of the 1990s. A
tentative eyeball-interpretation is that we could indeed be seeing a trend reversal
that is obscured by limiting one’s attention to the single summary present-value
bonus.
Two central issues are tackled in sections 2 and 3: first, the construction of price
deflators needed to convert nominal magnitudes into their corresponding real
counterparts; second, the estimation of the counterfactual income streams that
East Germans could have reasonably expected under a static continuation of the
GDR into the late 1990s. In sections 4 and 5 we combine observations, deflators
and counterfactuals to produce our empirical results. Given the necessarily
tentative nature of such calculations, we conclude our paper with a summary
that helps to identify certain structural weaknesses of our estimates that naturally
constitute an agenda for future research.
2 Getting real: deflators
The first order of business is the conversion of the GSOEP 1990 East German
income data (valued in GDR marks) into meaningful DM magnitudes. Indexes
of relative purchasing power used in a comparison involving two very different
economic systems need to adjust for differences in the extent of nonprice
rationing (i.e. quantity constraints) as well as for differences in the indirect
taxation/subsidization of consumer goods, see Collier (1986 and 1989). This is
particularly true when one considers the enormous differences between the East
and West housing markets and the degree of subsidization with respect to basic
foodstuffs and children’s clothing (in the East) in pre-unification Germany. The
estimates of real household net income used for this paper are based upon
purchasing power parities that provide at least partial correction for the
distortion of quantity constraints and the differential impact of indirect
taxes/subsidies across the GDR income distribution. In this section we provide
7the interested reader a brief description of the methodology used to calculate
exact price deflators.6
The key hypothesis behind the price deflators is that West and East Germans are
assumed to have had and still have identical preferences. This is completely
within the spirit of conventional applied demand analysis, some would even
argue it is the hallmark of economic analysis as opposed to sociological or
anthropological analysis. The difficult part of applying the tools of empirical
demand analysis to our problem is that these methods have evolved over the
decades in the analysis of household budgets in market economies for which
quantity constraints are a pathological exception rather than the rule. Certainly
for our GDR observations and at least in the initial years following German
economic unification, both budget and quantity constraints are an essential part
of the story.
This complication means that the presumption of the tangency of budget
constraints and indifference surfaces (a necessary condition for utility
maximization for households that are solely budget constrained in their
expenditure choices) is wholly inappropriate in an economic world of quantity
constraints. For this reason it would be invalid to use observed Eastern budgets
and quantity data to infer the parameters of the underlying preferences of
households without detailed information on the extent and incidence of quantity
constraints. One way out of this apparent dead-end is to exploit the existence of
the fraternal twin Germany, i.e. the old FRG, to estimate “all-German
preferences” from observed budgets and market baskets in West Germany and
to transplant the estimated demand system eastwards for the purpose of
interpreting the structure of household expenditure observed there.
The West German expenditure data7 are available according to a consistent
classification system for the period 1981-1998.  Demand systems were
estimated using annual average expenditures for (i) two-adult households
(predominantly elderly) whose principal source of income is public pensions
and/or public assistance and (ii) two-parent, two children households that are
disaggregated into middle-income and higher-income groups. The consumer
price indexes for the sixteen categories of expenditure in West Germany have
been assembled for the most part by a straight-forward chaining of the
                                          
6 The deflators used to convert nominal equivalent incomes into DM at 1991 West German
prices are taken from Collier (2001) to which the reader is referred for a full description of
both data and methods.
7 Statistisches Bundesamt Fachserie 15. Reihe 1. (1984-1998).
8corresponding indexes8 for base years 1980, 1985, 1991 and 1995. All category
price indexes have been set equal to unity for 1991.9
The specification used to calculate the corresponding exact deflators is a
generalization of the Cobb-Douglas demand system10 that permits budget shares
to vary systematically with real income. As in the simple Cobb-Douglas
specification, the compensated price elasticity of each good is minus unity. The
point of this generalization is that income elasticities are not constrained to be
equal to unity which is most desirable because West German data are clearly
consistent with Engel’s Law, i.e. budget shares do indeed vary systematically
with increasing real budgets, and our East German observations (for which we
need to forecast out-of-sample) are significantly below West German average
levels.
We assume a generalized Cobb Douglas demand system for indirect utility:
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where i (=1,2) denotes Eastern or Western Germany and k (=1,...,K) denotes the
sixteen categories of expenditure.11 The second equality is due to the fact that the
budget shares sum to unity in any period. We transform equation (1) into log-
form and obtain
(2) −=
k
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So that these preferences are indeed consistent with Engel’s law we explicitly let
the budget shares vary systematically with real income (indirect utility) itself.
                                          
8 Statistisches Bundesamt. Fachserie 17. Reihe 7 (1984-1998).
9 At the risk of restating the obvious: only price and expenditure for West Germany were
used in the estimation of the parameters of  German preferences.
10 For an earlier application of the generalized Cobb Douglas demand system used here, see
Collier (1986, 1989).
11 In the interest of avoiding yet another subscript to denote historical time, the reader should
note that in this specification prices (p), budget constraint (y) and the budget shares (β) can
all vary. By force of habit some readers might mistakenly regard the budget shares as
constants which is only true for a traditional Cobb-Douglas world which is only a special
case of the Generalized Cobb-Douglas specification.
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where the αk are proportional to budget shares βk if these do not differ in their
response γk with respect to real income (which itself is hidden in the indirect
utility ν) from the responses γm of other goods. To eliminate the denominator we
choose a reference category n (here food) and drop the country subscript (i) for
convenience
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In log-form we get our estimation equation
(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) vv kknknknk ln~~lnlnln γαγγααββ +=−+=
Thus we have (K-1) linear equations with observable prices, budget shares and
total budgets. The K-th equation for the estimated K parameters is obtained from
the condition that all budget shares are required to sum to unity. The log indirect
utility can be calculated with this information using equation (2).
The methodological trick that makes it possible to obtain the level of utility
corresponding to observed East German quantities is the calculation of
Rothbarthian virtual prices12 that would have led Eastern German households
(holding their budgets constant) to freely choose the quantities actually observed
in their quantity-constrained environment, e.g. higher prices on housing, lower
prices on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, etc. to bring demand in line with
supply. Expressed somewhat differently, we are able to sweep away the quantity
constraints that we do not observe directly by taking the system of estimated
Marshallian demand functions from West Germany to calculate virtual prices
that (together with the original budget constraint) would have been consistent
with the quantities in the constrained market baskets that we observe. Holding
that level of utility constant for the Eastern German household and putting 1991
West German prices into the indirect utility function (all equal to unity since we
are using the base year for this calculation), we find the size of the budget that a
household would have needed at 1991 DM prices (West!) to attain the utility
associated with effective Eastern expenditures valued at actual Eastern prices.
The recipe for the exact deflators is the following:
                                          
12 See Rothbarth (1941) as well as Neary and Roberts (1980).
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1) Equation (5) is estimated using West German data to obtain estimates of the
all German preference parameters α~  and γ~  from K-1 estimating equations.
2) Using the preference parameters estimated in step 1) and holding the
observed East German budget constraint constant, the level of the indirect
utility function and the virtual prices associated with the observed quantities
are simultaneously calculated.
3) Using the level of East German utility just calculated, we can calculated the
DM expenditure total that would have been necessary to attain that level of
utility at 1991 West German prices.
4) The deflator is obtained by dividing the observed East German expenditure
by the 1991-DM expenditure from step 3). The deflator has the dimension of
Eastern marks per DM (1991 prices).
The original Eastern German family budget surveys for 1989 as well as the first
and second halves of 1990 were re-aggregated to conform to the Western
German classification system by team working for the Federal Statistical
Office13 and fully comparable family budget surveys in East and West have been
conducted since 1991. Thus the time series of annual average family budgets for
Eastern and Western Germany for retired two adult households and middle-
income/ high-income four person (two adults/two children) households are
reasonably consistent both across time and space.
To obtain the consumer price indexes for Eastern Germany at the sixteen
category level used here, it was necessary to combine a bridge between the East
and West German price levels from the second half on 199314 with chained
indexes for the Eastern German category price levels15.  In other words, category
by category direct price comparisons between East and West for one point in
time have been backcast to 1989 and forward to 1998. When an Eastern German
consumer price index computed this way has a value of unity, then the Eastern
German price level for that category of expenditure and that year was equal to
the West German price level in 1991. The Eastern German price level for the
consumption expenditure categories “food” and “rent” have remained below the
                                          
13 Statistisches Bundesamt (1993).
14 The survey is described in Ströhl (1994). Mr. Ströhl graciously provided disaggregated
data that made the East/West price bridges for our sixteen categories possible.
15 For May, June, July, December 1990 [ base 1989=100]: Statistisches Bundesamt (1992a:
15-19, 23-27, 63-67). For July 1990, December 1990 [base July 1990-June1991=100]:
Statistisches Bundesamt (1992b). 1991 indexes [ base July 1990-June1991=100]:
Statistisches Bundesamt Fachserie 17. Reihe 7. (1993: 234-262). 1991-1998 taken from
unpublished series made available by the Federal Statistical Office.
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corresponding West German price levels for those categories 1991 for the entire
period under consideration.
The ratio of the observed Eastern budget to this minimum budget for 1991 DM
Western prices is the exact deflator that we use, where “exact” is meant in the
sense of the economic theory of index numbers, i.e. corresponding exactly to the
particular specification used to model preferences. The deflators for the three
different household types are plotted in Figure 2 . It is important to note that the
purchasing power of the Eastern German mark before monetary unification with
the West for all three household types turns out to have been in fact greater than
the DM at the time.16  Furthermore the lower a household’s budget constraint,
the greater was the purchasing power (i.e. the smaller the deflator used to divide
nominal magnitudes valued at Eastern prices).
Figure 2: Deflators for East German households (1991 West German Price Level = 1.00)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Collier (2001).
                                          
16 Unfortunately it is very easy to confuse deflators (factors that are divided into a nominal
magnitude) with purchasing power parities (factors that multiply nominal magnitudes) in
order to obtain real magnitudes. While the matter is merely one of multiplicative inverses,
the readers are forewarned to watch their steps.
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3 Back in the GDR: income forecasts
For the  purpose of establishing a baseline level of real disposable income, we
are extremely fortunate to have the extraordinary data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP)17. As an individual household micro-data panel, the
GSOEP is a rich data source for analyzing income dynamics in relation with
various individual and household characteristics. The GSOEP survey began in
1984 in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The GSOEP was expanded to
include households from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in June 1990,
hardly half a year after the Berlin wall had fallen and just before monetary union
took place. The empirical results presented in this section are based on that 1990
sample representing the Germans residing in the GDR at the time of the
survey.18
Table 1: Sample selection
Cases left in sample
Respondents GSOEP 1990-1998 2528
Interview conducted prior to July 1990 2409
German nationality 2403
Respondents above age 25 2144
Non-missing values for income 2117
Sample used for regression (excludes missing values 1990) 2110
Sample used for income forecast
(excludes missing values 1990-1998)
1944
Further sample selection criteria are listed in Table 1. Our analysis covers all
GDR respondents who participated in the survey in 1990 (before July) and
remained in the panel in each subsequent year through 1998. It contains only
German nationals. We have further restricted our sample to respondents 25 years
and older at the time of unification in order to include only individuals who
already had completed their education at the time of German unification so that
our results should not be affected by postwall educational decisions. Thus we
have excluded the youngest adult cohorts to avoid the considerable complication
entailed in valuing the returns to education. Observations with missing data for
income or any of the explanatory variables have also been dropped. The sample
                                          
17 For more information on the GSOEP see Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer (1993) and
Projektgruppe Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (1995).
18 A small fraction of interviews were conducted after monetary union went into effect on
July 1, 1990. We have only included respondents who participated in the panel before that
date so that all income variables from 1990 are expressed in GDR marks.
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used for income estimation consists of 2110 men and women ages 25 to 85.
Descriptive statistics of the sample are provided in Table B1 of Appendix B.
The average age of the sample selected is 45 for women and 44 for men. The
final sample used for the projection of counterfactual income streams through
1998 comprises 1944 men and women.
We calculate household equivalent income using the so-called "modified OECD
equivalence scale" which assigns a weight of unity for the first adult living in a
household and then adds 0.5 for each additional adult living in the household
and/or 0.3 for each child under the age of 16. This particular equivalence scale
has been chosen largely because it appears with increasing frequency in the
income inequality literature. Nonetheless it is with some trepidation that we use
weights that have evolved for market economies to adjust the GDR household
incomes in our sample for 1990. The theory and practice of computing
household equivalence scales for centrally planned economies in which quantity
constraints, in-kind benefits and indirect taxation for distributive purposes all
play a large role is entirely lacking at present so there is not much to do here
beyond recognize this serious difficulty — and move on.
The natural logarithm of household equivalent income is used as a dependent
variable in our income forecast regression. Regressions have been run separately
for women and men. The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1. From
these regressions we obtain our equivalized income forecasts.19
As explanatory variables we include information on age, schooling, additional
education, job characteristics such as the occupational status, tenure and whether
someone is employed or receiving a pension. Thus our default category is “not
participating in the labor force or unemployed”. Further regressor variables
include a dummy variable for working in the manufacturing or production sector
and a dummy variable for living in Berlin.
                                          
19 Granting more than a passing resemblance, this specification should not be confused with
Mincer-type earnings or wage equations. The crucial difference is in our goal of predicting
household equivalent incomes and not individual earnings. Household equivalent income
is the more appropriate measure for welfare comparisons which is what we are after.
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Table 2: OLS regression: equivalized income (logarithm) in 1990
               Women        Men
Coefficient
Estimate
Robust
Stand. Error
Coefficient
Estimate
Robust
Stand. Error
Age group
25-34 -0.0050 0.0043 -0.0164 0.0051
35-44 0.0198 0.0033 0.0188 0.0037
45-54 0.0015 0.0041 0.0039 0.0039
55-64 -0.0291 0.0075 -0.0136 0.0058
Above 64 -0.0154 0.0048 -0.0171 0.0071
Schooling
(Basic level secondary
schooling, 9 years)
No schooling -0.2696 0.1436 -0.1628 0.1812
Middle secondary
schooling, 10 years
0.0357 0.0251 0.0506 0.0218
High school diploma,
12 years
0.0710 0.0386 0.1561 0.0359
Other 0.2003 0.0742 -0.0062 0.0926
Additional education
(Apprenticeship)
No degree -0.0863 0.0324 -0.0086 0.0827
College degree 0.0750 0.0222 0.0365 0.0248
University degree 0.1649 0.0415 0.0671 0.0408
Employment status
Employed 0.1927 0.0363 0.1959 0.0619
Pensioner 0.1316 0.0652 0.1001 0.0787
Job characteristics
(Employees with high
qualification)
Tenure 0.0064 0.0027 0.0035 0.0026
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Unskilled -0.0902 0.0253 -0.0472 0.0458
Skilled worker -0.0807 0.0277 -0.0064 0.0288
Master craftsman 0.0902 0.0541 0.0195 0.0354
Farmer -0.1026 0.0407 -0.0873 0.0328
Self employed -0.0765 0.0718 0.0143 0.0503
Executives 0.1076 0.0464 0.1940 0.0463
Industrial sector
Production sector -0.0239 0.0189 -0.0456 0.0195
Region
Berlin 0.0715 0.0346 0.1464 0.0319
Constant 6.5959 0.0454 6.6757 0.0695
R-squared 0.3485 0.2707
Source: GSOEP, Sample C "German residents  in  the  GDR", 1990.
Note: Robust standard errors. Reference categories in parentheses. According to the F-test for women tenure
and tenure squared are jointly significant at the 1%-level, for men tenure and tenure squared are jointly
significant at the 10%-level.
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Variables for firm size and industrial sectors, as used by Puhani and Steiner
(1996) and Franz and Steiner (2000) for explaining East German wages, were
not found significantly related to household equivalent income and are therefore
not included in the estimation equation presented here.
One of the most important explanatory variables for predicting future income is
the individual’s age. The shape of the age-income profile however strongly
depends on the assumed underlying functional form of the relationship between
age and equivalence income. By using a spline function one can better allow for
non-linearities in this relationship while retaining a simple specification.20 We
have chosen a specification using a linear spline function with five different
linear splines, corresponding to five age groups (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65
years of age and older).
In Figure 3 we can see the resulting age-income locus for the spline function
thus specified. For the purpose of comparison, a different age-income
specification using a linear plus a quadratic age term, is also shown.21
Figure 3: Age-income profiles for women and men (monthly household income
equivalence in East German marks)
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP wave 1990
From these profiles it is obvious that a specification quadratic in age would not
be sufficiently flexible to reflect the age-income profile we observe. The spline
function has the advantage of being more flexible in these two variables, a
property which seems to be particularly valuable for younger age groups for
                                          
20 Linear splines capture the relationship between two variables as a piecewise linear
function, in other words a function composed of linear segments joined at knots.
21 Both curves belong to the profile of a person who worked as a skilled employee, having
zero years of tenure and who falls into each of the reference categories used in the
estimation equation for all remaining variables.
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both men and women. For the youngest age group the quadratic specification
had the greatest positive slope which seems to be at odds with the data, while the
more flexible specification displays a negative relationship between equivalent
income and age for younger age groups. We see that our estimates reveal the
first spline to have a negative relationship between age and equivalized
income22. This certainly reflects family formation and children that together
work to lower these individuals‘ equivalized incomes quite substantially
compared to their younger counterparts who are more likely to be single. This
relationship between equivalent income and age will be crucial in estimating the
income forecasts which is done in the next section of the paper.
Schooling is in general significantly related with the income measure: The more
schooling one has the higher the household equivalent income. The same is true
for formal training. Occupational status seems to be of more importance for
women’s income than for men’s,  judging from the calculated standard errors of
the coefficient estimates. Both the linear and the quadratic terms of tenure are
jointly significant for women only. Being employed raises equivalized income
by 19.3% for women and 19.6% for men23. The pensioner dummy shows an
effect different from zero for female household equivalent income. The
industrial sector dummy is only significant in the men’s regression, where  a job
in the manufacturing or production sector is associated with lower income.
Residing in East Berlin, the former capital of the GDR, has a positive effect for
both women and men. East Berlin women were found to have a 7% higher
equivalized income compared to the rest of the GDR whereas for East Berlin
men the comparable difference was 15%.
4 Static counterfactual
This section combines results from the two foregoing sections to get the real
income forecasts and the real observed incomes (valued at 1991 West German
DM prices). The critical assumption behind our forecasts of a counterfactual
1990s of continued life in the GDR is that of static expectations regarding
individual income. The estimated unification bonus is thus a lower bound for the
true magnitude since static expectations for a hypothetical GDR economy in the
last decade of the twentieth century is optimistic, even wildly so. We have
experimented with three different variations of static expectations to see the
sensitivity of our calculations. First, the word static is taken literally and we
simply assume the same household equivalent income for each persons in the
                                          
22 Although this effect is not statistically significant different from zero for women.
23 The impact of the individual employment status turns out quite low due to the equilization
procedure. Household equivalized income is less sensitive than individual income with
respect to  individual differences.
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sample for the following years from 1991 to 1998 as calculated from the
GSOEP 1990 wave for the former GDR. Second, we assume a constant annual
income growth rate of 3 percent. This rate is slightly lower than the reported
growth of nominal incomes in the 1980s to allow for a slight hidden inflation24.
The third variant of income projections is based upon a life-cycle, made in
GDR.
The notion of a life cycle of income in a static economy enables us to exploit the
cross section of economic life reported in the first Eastern wave of GSOEP in
1990 for the purpose of generating our (third) counterfactual forecasts of real
income streams. Our forecasts use the regression coefficients reported in Table
2. As mentioned earlier, the sample was restricted to persons 25 years and older
at the time of the GSOEP survey in 1990 to prevent the forecasts from being
distorted by endogenous education decisions.
The assumptions concerning the life cycle forecast can be summarized as
follows. Static expectations generate us a pure age effect, so we implicitly
assume no cohort effect. The education decision is ignored due to the sample
selection of persons 25 years and older in 1990. The mortality rates implicit in
our forecasts are the mortality rates that prevailed in the unified Germany for the
sample selected. The retirement decision was assumed truly static in the sense
that we implemented the retirement decision from our 1990 GDR sample.
For projection purposes we can distinguish between time-variant and time-
invariant variables. The former capture the basic idea of a life cycle that can be
estimated from a cross-section. From these cross-section estimates we forecast
future incomes by assuming that the latter variables do not change over the life
cycle and the former variables by definition would change. The only time-
variant variables in this sense are age, a variable that increments by one from
year to year, and job-related characteristics. As soon as a woman (man) reaches
the pension age of 60 (65),  both the participation and job-related dummies are
set to zero and the pension dummy is set to unity. These ages are the modal
1990 East German pension age for women and men. A detailed description and
documentation of the procedure for obtaining income forecasts is provided in
Appendix A.
These forecast incomes are valued in 1990 East German marks as suits the
counterfactual of a frozen GDR. They are transformed by using the deflators
from Section 2 above. Also the observed equivalized incomes are likewise
transformed into 1991 German marks using deflators calculated for each year.
                                          
24 This growth rate was calculated from Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, Zentrales Zählbüro (1989).
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The differences between observed and forecast real equivalized monthly income
are unification bonuses (if positive) or maluses (if negative) on a monthly basis.
These monthly rates are converted into an annual rate for our tables.
5 Evolution and distribution of the unification bonus
(malus)
One of the central empirical results of this paper is the summary statistic that the
proportion of East Germans with a present value unification malus through 1998
was 19 percent, using a five percent real annual interest rate for discounting.
This result, as all following, is based on the weighted income projection with the
sample weights accounting for selection into the sample in 1990 and selection of
staying in the panel until 1998. These calculations assume a individual
perspective and not a household perspective and the persons are at least 25 years
old in 1990.
The evolution of the annual incidence of a unification malus over time is
displayed in Figure 4. It illustrates the very rapid decline of the share of „losers“
in the first years following German social and monetary union in mid 1990. This
first episode ends in 1994. From that time on malus incidence declines at a much
slower speed and eventually in 1998 the trend even reverses. At this point in
time it is not possible to tell whether this trend reversal is significant and/or
continued.
Figure 4 also shows that basically all the three different measures calculated
here yield more or less the same overall pattern. For the upper line of Figure 4 a
three percent growth has been assumed. In this case the counterfactual obtained
in the former GDR is on average larger so the bonus (malus) is smaller (greater
in the sense of more negative). From Figure 4 we can see that income should
have increased at least three percent p.a. in the former GDR for an increase over
time of the malus incidence.
It can also be seen in Figure 4 that the bonus (malus) calculated with our life
cycle projection tracks quite closely the zero percent growth scenario. From the
confidence bands drawn in the figure (dotted lines) it can be seen that our life
cycle projection differs significantly from the zero growth scenario only at the
very beginning in 1991 as well as the end of the time interval from 1996
onwards. In 1994 the proportion of „losers“ is even higher (although not
significantly) than in a scenario of zero percent growth which we see as the most
mechanical manifestation of the static expectations assumption. This graph
illustrates our life cycle projection as a compromise between the two mechanical
growth rate scenarios of zero or three percent.
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Figure 4: Incidence of unification malus over time
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
Having followed the time path of the incidence of a unification malus, we now
turn to the evolution of the entire bonus/malus distribution over time. This can
be seen in the left panel of Figure 5 where kernel densities25 of the unification
bonus (malus) are plotted for 1991 and 1998. The areas under the curves and to
the left of the origin are equal to the proportion of persons experiencing a
unification malus for the particular year. This proportion fell from 38 percent in
1991 to 22 percent in 1998. But so did the variance of the bonuses. The
existence of a substantial proportion of „losers“ from unification can be seen as
unifying the results from the income inequality and income mobility literature
discussed in the introduction.
                                          
25 For the kernel density estimation we used the Gaussian kernel. The density estimate is
evaluated at 500 points and we used a bandwidth h that was chosen optimally according to
the formula 5/106.1 −⋅⋅= nmhopt  where m is the )349.1/,min( is  and s is the estimated
standard deviation, i the interquartile range and n is the sample size.
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Figure 5: Kernel density estimates of the German unification bonus
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
Comparing the kernel densities of the present value of the cumulative annual
bonuses for 1990-98 for women and men separately, one does not see a major
difference between the sexes. The mode of the distribution for women is a little
bit lower and occurs at a somewhat lower value of the present value bonus.
Tables 3-6 provide a variety of present value summaries of net gains and losses
for individuals using our life cycle forecast.26 Inspection of Tables 3 and 4
shows that the share of East Germans experiencing an annual unification malus
has fallen from 38% in 1991 to 22% in 1998. These are the numbers we also
saw illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. Individuals relatively hardest hit over the past
decade were people between the ages of 35 and 44 at the time of German
unification. Indeed the women of those cohorts show the only increase in the
proportion of „losers“ between 1991 and 1998. In 1998 41% of them
experienced a net loss due to unification. Without a doubt the clear „winners“ of
unification were those retired or approaching retirement age upon the creation of
the German monetary, economic and social union. Indeed by 1998 it is pretty
hard to find a Pareto loser among those men and women age 55 and older in
1990.
                                          
26 For comparison with the alternative counterfactuals in Appendix B we provideTables B2
and B3 that are forecast equilized incomes using the constant growth rates of 0% and 3%.
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Table 3: Unification malus incidence in 1991
Age group (1990) Women Men Total
25-34 0.39 0.43 0.41
35-44 0.38 0.42 0.40
45-54 0.47 0.41 0.45
55-64 0.38 0.49 0.43
65 and above 0.13 0.06 0.11
All ages, 25 and above 0.36 0.40 0.38
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
Table 4: Unification malus incidence in 1998
Age group (1990) Women Men Total
25-34 0.24 0.23 0.23
35-44 0.41 0.36 0.38
45-54 0.29 0.29 0.29
55-64 0.03 0.09 0.06
65 and above 0.03 0.02 0.03
All ages, 25 and above 0.21 0.23 0.22
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
Table 5: Incidence of a cumulative unification malus
(negative present value of 1991-98 actual less forecast equivalized incomes)
Age group (1990) Women Men Total
25-34 0.17 0.19 0.18
35-44 0.28 0.28 0.28
45-54 0.30 0.23 0.27
55-64 0.08 0.16 0.12
65 and above 0.01 0.02 0.01
All ages, 25 and above 0.18 0.20 0.19
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
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The entire course of annual unification bonuses and maluses from 1991 through
1998 are summarized in Table 5. We see that 19% of our sample suffered a
cumulative present value unification malus through 1998. We see the incidence
of a unification malus is slightly greater for men than for women, although
among the middle-aged cohorts women have been hit harder with the highest
cell incidence in Table 5 of 30% „losers“ found for 45 to 54 year-old women.
One is also struck by extremely small proportion of „losers“ among the elderly.
No less important than the incidence of a unification malus is the average
magnitude of the unification bonus which is tabulated in Table 6 for the same
age/sex groups as before. The present value of cumulative unification bonuses is
expressed in 1991 DM West German prices and as a percent of real adult
equivalent income in the GDR in 1990. For all age-gender combinations we see
that there was in fact a positive net unification bonus on average, i.e. „winners“
could have compensated „losers“ and remained „winners“ in all cells of the
table. One is also struck by the fact that the size of the average bonus of
unification “winners” above the age of 65 at the time of economic unification is
about 2.5 times larger than the corresponding figure for women “winners”
between the age of 35 and 44, that group with the lowest net average gain.
Table 6: Present value as of July 1, 1990 of cumulative 1991-98 unification
bonuses/maluses
Mean present value gain
Women Men Total
Age group 1991 DM
(West)
relative to
1990 real
income
1991 DM
(West)
relative to
1990 real
income
1991 DM
(West)
relative to
1990 real
income
25-34 26,363 1.69 27,228 1.75 26,790 1.72
35-44 19,017 1.20 22,493 1.37 20,812 1.29
45-54 20,652 1.20 25,231 1.46 22,882 1.33
55-64 41,038 3.02 25,743 1.62 34,318 2.40
65 and above 50,284 4.60 51,240 4.12 50,584 4.45
All, 25 and above 30,166 2.19 27,427 1.77 28,892 1.99
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
This same point can be illustrated somewhat differently in Table 7 which
provides both the average unification bonus of “winners” and the  average malus
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for “losers” again broken down by age and gender. We note that women “losers”
between the ages of 35 and 44 at the time of German economic unification
experienced the highest average net cumulative malus and that male “losers”
above the age of 65 experienced an average unification malus three times that of
women in the same age category. The main impression from an examination  of
Table 7 is that gender differences in size of the unification bonus are not nearly
as striking as the differences according to age at the time of unification.
A vivid visual impression of the extent to which the unification gains have
actually swamped the losses is provided by the cumulative distribution function
of the present discounted value of the 1991-98 unification bonus (Figure 7). The
CDF crosses the vertical axis at 19 percent which is the incidence of the
unification malus in our sample. The shaded areas to the left and right of the
vertical axis can be interpreted as the aggregate losses and gains respectively.
The sum of cumulative present value bonuses is about ten times the magnitude
of the sum of cumulative present value maluses.
Table 7: Present value bonus and malus as of July 1, 1990 of cumulative 1991-98
unification bonuses/maluses
Mean present value bonus and malus in 1991 DM (West)
Women Men Total
Age group bonus malus bonus malus bonus malus
25-34 34,209 12,831 37,195 16,356 35,664 14,666
35-44 34,957 21,619 36,432 14,163 35,752 17,805
45-54 35,746 14,212 37,843 17,504 36,820 15,586
55-64 45,585 9,289 33,528 14,711 40,552 12,564
65 and above 50,855 6,217 53,010 18,926 51,524 12,947
All, 25 and
above 40,097 15,459 38,171 15,838 39,213 15,646
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of the unification bonus (1991 DM prices)
Source: Authors´ calculations using GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
At this point it is most interesting to compare the results of direct public surveys
with the results of our calculations. The German weekly newspaper DIE ZEIT 27
on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of German unification in 2000 repeated
an opinion survey of East Germans it conducted in 1993. The new survey found
that the proportion of self-reported „losers“ from unification had fallen from 24
to 19%. Another survey on subjective well-being in East Germany asked
whether individual living conditions improved or deteriorated since 1990
(Habich, Noll, and Zapf 1999). Whereas in 1993 23% of the respondents
claimed a deterioration, by 1998 this share had fallen to only 16%. For those
who might find the combination of econometrics, assumption and data in this
paper somewhat mysterious, perhaps the proportions of self-proclaimed
unification „losers“ from these public opinion surveys helps to demonstrate a
broad consistency between quite disparate and independent sources of evidence.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides the first application of newly calculated purchasing power
parities between East and West Germany in order to provide a statistical picture
of the evolution and distribution of the real economic gains and losses due to
German unification within the new federal states. In contrast to previous studies
we attempt to correct for two special aspects of GDR socialist reality that have
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prevented researchers from fully exploiting the unique 1990 nominal net
household income data in East Germany from the GSOEP survey to compare
with household income data from later surveys. The measurement of economic
welfare attainable under the old GDR regime is greatly complicated by the fact
that significant microeconomic quantity constraints (e.g. housing and
automobiles) are known to have existed along with a system of indirect taxes
and consumer price subsidies. Together these characteristics of GDR socialism
meant that the relative purchasing power of the old GDR mark was quite
different depending upon one’s place in the income distribution. Similarly the
system of material balances and quantity constraints as opposed to market
supply and demand also had a significant distributional impact. The deflators
that we have constructed, differentiated by equivalized income, are the keys
needed to release the changes in economic welfare locked in the observed
changes in nominal incomes.
Consistent with the general macroeconomic picture, we find a clear and
overwhelming economic bonus on average for East Germans.  Just as much a
part of the story of postwall economic reconstruction are those who have
suffered a unification malus, understood here to be a negative present-value of
annual differences between the course of actual income and a counterfactual
forecast of income in a frozen GDR. About 19 percent of the East German
population older than 25 in 1990 and who remained in the sample until 1998 are
identified as having experienced a unification malus. We have found that in
contrast to what has been observed in other economies in transition from the old
socialist order, elderly East Germans have not only gained much more than
other age groups, but that for all intents and purpose our sample of East German
elderly survived the fall of communism in a way that both Helmut Kohl and
Vilfredo Pareto could score as an improvement in economic welfare. At the
other end of the bonus distribution, the smallest average unification bonus was
found for women between the ages of 35 and 44 at the time of German
unification. Thirty percent of that group were identified as unification „losers“.
We are confident that our estimated proportion of economic “losers” represents
an upper bound since it was calculated under the assumption of static
expectations for our GDR counterfactual. The GDR economy was riding a
downward trend at the time of its political demise and few believe that it would
have been able to even maintain 1989 living standards over the past decade.
Thus while allowing for the psychological salience of the last days of the GDR,
as an economic matter we have almost certainly overstated the number of
economic „losers“.
To break the stranglehold of quantity constraints on the interpretation of
consumer behavior under socialism it was necessary to import demand
parameters from elsewhere. For most economists it would appear natural to
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assume that East Germans were actually just West Germans who were
significantly poorer and more repressed. This critical assumption is necessary to
justify using West German household budgets to construct deflators for East
German households.
Our attention has been limited to household income and its power to purchase
consumer goods and services. The transformation of the East German economy
of course involved a fundamental redefinition of many property rights. The
capital gains from owning a modest family house on prime postwall land, the
value of the family farm or the loss of a bargain housing rental to the heirs of an
expropriated owner are not touched upon in this paper. In particular we have not
attempted to assess the unification bonus with respect to asset holdings – as
opposed to equivalent income in this study – due to the lack of such data in the
GSOEP.
It is also important to add what may seem to be an obvious qualification given
the title of the paper, we have nothing to say here about the unification bonus or
malus for West Germans. Between four and five percent of West German GDP
every year has been the size of the net West to East transfer during the past
decade. Comparing the average East German welfare gains with the average
West German losses is a most interesting question, though probably a better use
of scarce research time would be to identify the policy mistakes that still leave
nearly one third of the East German potential working force in a social safety net
financed by West Germany.
Having struggled to extract meaning from these data, we feel an obligation to
provide a short list of promising leads for future research.
The issue of the appropriate equivalence scale within a market economy at a
point in time is just about as subtle as any in the measurement of economic
welfare (cf. Lewbel 1997). Our choice of using the modified OECD scale has
only the virtue in being comparable with a vast empirical literature on income
distribution and while we find ourselves good company, we still believe that it is
unlikely that one scale is going to fit all places and all times, least of all for
economic transitions from central planning to market allocation. It is certainly
our hope that future researchers will be able to remedy this weakness.
While the deflators upon which our estimates of the unification bonus are based
do attempt to correct for the spillover of demand across aggregate spending
categories, say, from consumer electronics to alcoholic beverages, this is only
part of the story. What is still missing is the breadth of product variety in a
market economy that was missing in the centrally planned economies. For
example one could travel, but as a general rule one could not travel on holiday in
the West. What is the value of the introduction of that single ‘new product’ with
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the fall of the Wall? This has been found to be an important shortcoming of
traditional consumer price indexes for market economies, e.g. Hausman’s (1999)
study that documents the welfare gains from the introduction of the new product
cell-phones in the U.S. To that extent we have further reason to believe that our
estimates of unification “losers” is an upper bound.
We wish to close on a substantive note and point to the disturbing pattern that
one can see in the evolution of the annual unification bonus over time.
Completely consistent with the marked slowdown in GDP as seen in the first set
of figures of this paper, the number of “losers” appears to be rising at the end of
our period of investigation. This comes as no surprise to those familiar with the
economic and political situation in the new federal states. One may presume that
GDR policy makers did not intend to waste over a quarter of the East German
labor force either. What the communist leadership lacked was the capacity to tap
the West German taxpayer on anything approaching the scale of the unification
bonus that we have estimated.
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Appendix A: Illustrative calculation of the unification
bonus for a woman with a median present value bonus
In the tables to follow we provide an illustrative calculation of the present value
unification bonus. We have selected the case of the woman in our sample who
happened to have received the median bonus. She was 34 years of age at the
time of German monetary union in mid-1990, living in Saxony (i.e., not in
Berlin). There were two children under age 16 living in her household. This
illustrative calculation reveals her (median) bonus for the postwall period
through 1998 was 24,754 DM.
The first step of the calculation is presented in Table A1 where the actual
equivalized income from observed household net income is calculated for each
year using the modified OECD equivalence scale28. As the 1990-income has
been reported before monetary union it is given in East German marks (M), the
amounts of the following years are expressed in nominal DM.
Table A1: Calculation of nominal equivalized monthly income
Year 1990 1991 ... 1998
Actual monthly household net income 1600 M 2100 DM 3600 DM
Household size 4 4 3
Number of children under 16 in the household 2 2 0
Actual equivalised income calculated
according to the modified OECD equivalence
scale
761.9 M 1000 DM 1800 DM
Natural log of equivalized income calculated
according to the modified OECD equivalence
scale
6.6358 6.9078 7.4955
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
The log of nominal equivalized income in 1990 is the dependent variable for the
linear regressions reported in the main text. The coefficient estimates presented
here are used to forecast equivalized income (in GDR prices) for 1991 to 1998.
                                          
28 The use of the OECD equivalence scale with its lower weights on children as opposed to,
say, the scale implicit in the German Social Assistance scheme (Bundessozialhilfegesetz)
can also be interpreted as a rough procedure to incorporate the extensive subsidization of
children’s clothing and childcare facilities in the former GDR. For the impact of different
equivalence scales see Burkhauser, Smeeding and Merz (1996) or Atkinson, Rainwater and
Smeeding (1995).
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A crucial distinction is drawn between the individual’s time-variant and time-
invariant characteristics displayed in Table A2. This is relevant for the life cycle
forecasts. Two other forecasts were obtained by simply assuming a zero or three
percent growth rates for the counterfactual income streams in a GDR assumed to
have survived the fall of the Berlin Wall. Obviously the time-invariant variables
are held constant over the forecasted time periods. The time-variant variables are
adjusted each year as described in Table A2.
Table A2: Time-variant and time–invariant variables for the income forecasts
Time-variant Variables
Age increases by one from year to year.
Age groups (25-34, 35-44, ...) are then adjusted accordingly.
Tenure, Tenure squared: set to zero at age 61 for women and age 66 for men. These are the
gender-specific empirical retirement ages from our 1990 GSOEP cross-section.
Labor force status: Out of the labor force and unemployed [default], Employed: switches to
zero as people reach the gender-specific empirical retirement age (61 for women and 66 for
men), Pensioner: switches to one as people reach the gender-specific empirical retirement age
Occupational status (Unskilled, Skilled worker, Master craftsman, Farmer, Self employed,
Executives) set to zero as people reach the gender-specific empirical retirement age
Production sector switches to zero at the gender-specific empirical retirement ages
Time-invariant Variables
Schooling
Basic level secondary schooling (9 years) [default],
No schooling, Medium level secondary schooling 10 years, High school diploma 13 years,
Other diploma
Additional education
Apprenticeship [default],
No degree, College degree, University degree
Job characteristics
Employees with high qualification [default]
Region
Berlin [default]
The impact of the most important time-varying variable can be seen from
Figure  3 where the equivalent income – age profile is plotted. Under the
assumption of static expectations we can use cross-section data to construct the
life cycle of individuals, e.g. we assume there are no cohort or time effects, and
proceed to the income forecasts. For the example of the woman from Saxony
with the median-present-value-bonus, we adjust the time-varying variables over
the relevant time period from 1990 to 1998 according to the description in
Table A2. The median woman enters another age group over the time period and
her tenure increases, whereas all other characteristics remain the same because
she continued working. At the empirical retirement age of 60 for women and 65
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for men the retirement dummy switches to one and the participation dummy to
zero. In the first two rows of Table A3 we present the fitted/forecasted values.
Due to the fact that the regression explains far less than one hundred percent of
the variance, the income forecast for 1990 can of course differ quite
substantially from the actual income in that year as seen in this illustrative case
(third row of Table A3). To eliminate such an artificial fall from the actual
equivalent income in 1990 to the fitted values of equivalent income in
subsequent years, we calculate the growth rate of the preliminary income
forecasts between two successive years using the preliminary income forecasts.
This estimated growth rate is then used to adjust the true 1990 equivalent
income, also shown in the last row of Table A3. Thus one is able to generate the
forecasts for income valued  at 1990 GDR prices.
Table A3: Adjustment of monthly income forecasts
1990 1991
Logarithm of equivalized income forecast 6.6979 6.7222
Logarithm of actual equivalized income 6.6358 -6.9078
Unadjusted equivalized income forecast 838.68 859.31
Preliminary income forecast 838.68 859.31
Growth rate of preliminary income forecast - 0.0246
Actual equivalized income 761.91 -
Equivalized income forecast (equals the preliminary
income forecast times the growth factor)
761.91 780.65
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
To convert these income forecasts into income forecasts valued in 1991 West
German marks we use the purchasing power parities from Collier (2001). A
middle income Eastern German household in 1989 would have needed about 38
percent more DM income East Mark income in order to reach the same level of
utility achieved at Eastern German prices with quantity constraints.
The GSOEP wave that we use as a basis for our forecasts was conducted in
spring 1990. We have chosen to convert (Spring) 1990 income by 1989
purchasing power parities because people already anticipated the monetary
union of July 1, 1990 in the first half of 1990. For this reason we would expect
the 1989 official household budget data used for the calculated purchasing
power parities to be cleaner in the sense of being more representative of what
the GDR economy really looked like before monetary union.
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As Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998) have noted in the context of absolute
international income comparisons, it is questionable “whether a single index is
appropriate for all points in the distribution”. Precisely for this reason we use the
three different purchasing power parities corresponding to different points of the
GDR household income distribution as estimated by Collier (2001).
We have transformed reported household incomes by using the modified OECD
equivalence scale under the assumption that in the type II and III households one
of the two children is under age sixteen and the other is older. Thus we
“equivalize” the household incomes in the three household types by dividing by
1.5 for type I and 2.3 for both types II and III.
These three household equivalent incomes with their respective deflators have
been plotted using linear interpolation between the points as seen in Figure A1.
With this empirical relationship between equivalized income and deflator of that
income, we are able to convert nominal 1990 East German household equivalent
incomes into 1991 DM values. This conversion is shown for our illustrative case
of the median present-value-bonus woman in Table A4. Because the household
equivalent income for this case is 762 Eastern Marks in 1990,  slightly
exceeding the first threshold of 707 Marks in Figure A1, her equivalized income
has been deflated by a factor of 0.6238 obtained by interpolation. This results in
a monthly real household equivalent income of 1222 in 1990 valued in DM for
the year 1991.
For 1991 the median bonus woman had a forecast household equivalent income
(recall that counterfactual incomes are always valued in constant GDR Marks)
of 781 DM. This amount is slightly higher than her income in 1990 and so a
higher deflator of 0.6302 is used to yield a real household equivalent income
forecast of 1239 DM (1991) as seen in Table A4.
Similarly deflators for all other years are used to deflate observed monthly
nominal incomes from GSOEP –the disposable income for Eastern German
households in unified Germany- to obtain real monthly incomes valued in 1991
DM.
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Figure A1: Deflators for different household equivalent incomes for 1990
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Collier (2001)
With the real household equivalent income and the real household equivalent
income forecasts now measured in common units (1991 DM), we take
differences to obtain our estimate of the annual real monthly unification bonus.
In Table A4 below we see that the illustrative monthly bonus in 1991 was 109
DM (valued in 1991 Western prices).
Assuming a five percent annual real interest rate that translates into a monthly
real interest rate of 0.407 percent, we transform the monthly bonus or malus into
an annual bonus or malus. For this illustrative case we multiply the monthly
malus of 109 DM by 11.69 to obtain the annual malus of 1270 DM in Table A4.
Performing month-to-year calculations for each year from 1991 to 1998 and
discounting each annual value using the five percent real annual interest rate, we
find that the median unification bonus turns out to have had a present value of
24,754 DM in 1991 West German prices as of July 1, 1990.
Similar calculations were performed for each of the 1944 cases in our sample.
These individual calculations - after sample re-weighting - are the data behind
the tables and figures of the text.
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Table A4: Calculation of real monthly/annual/present-value  bonuses
1990 1991
Household equivalent income 761.91 1000
Appropriate deflator 0.6238 0.7422
Real household equivalent income 1221.50 1347.41
Household monthly  equivalent income forecast 761.90 780.65
Appropriate deflator 0.6238 0.6302
Real monthly household equivalent income forecast 1221.50 1238.78
Monthly unification bonus 0 108.63
Annual unification bonus (using five percent real
annual interest rate)
0 1269.67
Present value unification bonus (for median woman) in
1991 DM at July 1. 1990
                24,754
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
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Appendix B
Table B1: Sample characteristics 1990
Women Men
Mean Stand. Dev. Mean Stand. Dev.
Household characteristics
Children under 16 years in
household
         .48          .50 .50 .50
Household size        3.04        1.18 3.18        1.07
Total net household income  1830.20    717.69 1956.90    637.50
Equivalized income (modified
OECD-scale)
   977.71    301.69 1027.89  1009.42
Individual characteristics
Age     44.90      13.57     43.73     12.04
Schooling
(Difference from basic level
secondary schooling, 9 years)
No schooling        .003 .05   .004  .06
Medium level secondary
schooling, 10 years
         .46 .50   .44   .50
High school diploma, 13 years          .11 .32   .18  .39
Additional education (Difference
from apprenticeship)
No degree          .12 .32   .02   .15
College degree          .24 .43   .27   .44
University degree          .08 .27   .14 .34
Employment status
Employed          .77 .42 .91 .28
Pensioner          .15 .36 .06 .23
Job characteristics (Difference
from employees with high
qualification)
Unskilled white/blue collar          .18 .38 .07 .25
Skilled worker          .12 .32 .35 .48
Master craftsman          .01 .11 .07 .25
Farmer          .05 .21 .12 .32
Self employed          .02 .13 .04 .18
Executives          .01 .11 .03 .17
Tenure      10.15     10.33     13.84     11.60
Industrial sector
Production sector          .32         .47         .60         .49
Region
Berlin          .07 .25 .07 .25
Number of observations  1142         968
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP wave 1990
Table B2: Incidence of a cumulative unification malus
(negative present value of 1991-98 actual less constant equivalized income)
Age group (1990) Women Men Total
25-34 0.13 0.18 0.15
35-44 0.13 0.16 0.15
45-54 0.25 0.21 0.23
55-64 0.22 0.26 0.24
65 and above 0.03 0.04 0.03
All ages, 25 years and above 0.16 0.19 0.17
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
Table B3: Incidence of a cumulative unification malus
(negative present value of 1991-98 actual less 3% per year trend equivalized
income)
Age group (1990) Women Men Total
25-34 0.31 0.32 0.31
35-44 0.28 0.36 0.32
45-54 0.36 0.36 0.36
55-64 0.36 0.44 0.39
65 and above 0.10 0.08 0.09
All ages, 25 years and above 0.29 0.34 0.31
Source: Authors´ calculations based on GSOEP waves 1990 to 1998
